Even though Central Asia is water rich, water disputes have characterized the region after crumbling of the Soviet Union in 1991. The uneven spatial distribution and complex pattern of transboundary water sources with contrasting national water needs have created an intricate water dilemma. Increasing national water needs, water claims by surrounding countries, uncertainties in renewable water volumes, and effects of climate change will put further strain on the future water use in Central Asia. We argue that the present power distribution with three downstream hegemons (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and two upstream much poorer countries with less political influence (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) is not likely to lead forward to a greater willingness to share water. We discuss this situation with the analogue Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia in the Nile Basin. Thus, as in the case of Ethiopia in the Nile Basin, gradually economically stronger upstream countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to hydropower development are likely to eventually re-define the hydropolitical map of Central Asia. As in the case of the Nile Basin, a more even power balance between upstream and downstream countries may lead to an improved political structure for a much needed better collaboration on water issues.
Introduction
Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, represents an important strategic geopolitical region. Historically, the area is known as the "The Great Game" in terms of describing the political and diplomatic skirmishes that occurred between Britain and Russia during most of the 19th century. During recent years, this term has again surfaced as the region is in the center of the triangle China, Russia, and India [1] . The sudden renewed interest in the area became obvious after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The region is in general water rich as well as rich in hydrocarbon resources but is still economically underdeveloped with a strong ethnic diversity [2] .
Throughout the Soviet Union era, the region's natural resources were managed in a system that would maximize the regional economic output. For example, downstream riparians like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would grow cotton using water supplied by the upstream riparian Kyrgyzstan [3, 4] . In return, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan supplied Kyrgyzstan with coal and gas to compensate for less water for hydropower [2] . The sudden crumbling of the Soviet Union in 1991 and appearance of the five independent Central Asian states changed the geopolitical landscape and the views on how to manage the natural resources. Even though different multilateral treaties have been agreed upon between the Central Asian states over the years to ascertain this resource-sharing regime, conflicts have arisen. For example, repeated conflicts between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have occurred due to problems in this resource sharing. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Dinar [4] . Once the Soviet Union had disintegrated, water resources became politicized and part of the national interests [5] . For example, during a presidential meeting in Astana in 2012, the Uzbek president Islam Karimov emphasized that water resources problems could cause wars [6] . Recent research on the possible reduction of water supply from melting of the Tien Shan glaciers (Figure 1 ) has resurfaced the fear of water wars in Central Asia [7] . The passing of president Karimov on 2 September 2016 raises important questions for the future of the region with the intertwined water issue.
Water 2017, 9, 139 2 of 17 manage the natural resources. Even though different multilateral treaties have been agreed upon between the Central Asian states over the years to ascertain this resource-sharing regime, conflicts have arisen. For example, repeated conflicts between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have occurred due to problems in this resource sharing. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Dinar [4] . Once the Soviet Union had disintegrated, water resources became politicized and part of the national interests [5] . For example, during a presidential meeting in Astana in 2012, the Uzbek president Islam Karimov emphasized that water resources problems could cause wars [6] . Recent research on the possible reduction of water supply from melting of the Tien Shan glaciers (Figure 1 ) has resurfaced the fear of water wars in Central Asia [7] . The passing of president Karimov on 2 September 2016 raises important questions for the future of the region with the intertwined water issue. Central Asia with major regional water resources [8] .
Already four years after the downfall of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was identified as a region close to potential conflict regarding natural resource use [9, 10] . Although Central Asia is not water poor, a major part of the available water resources is concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In fact, main surface runoff of the Aral Sea Basin (about 93 km 3 /year or 80%) is formed in the upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [11] . However, the main use of water (85%) occurs in downstream Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The two major rivers of the region, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, originate in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan (Figures 1 and 2 ). For this reason, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control most of the water resources needed by the other downstream states. However, Afghanistan also constitutes an important and up to now more or less silent riparian. Sharing of the water from the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya has exposed a complex picture of water needs and potential political conflict [12] [13] [14] . During the last decades of the 20th century, the Aral Sea, the fourth largest lake in the world, has shrunk significantly [15] . This occurred due to increase of irrigated agricultural area from 4.3 to 8.2 million ha. When the ecology changed, an area of hundred thousand square kilometers containing a population of several million was jeopardized [16, 17] .
Gleick [18] (see also Dinar [4] for a discussion) notes that four main characteristics decide the graveness of a hydropolitical conflict:(1) the degree of scarcity, mismanagement, and misallocation of water in the region and the importance of water to a particular state; (2) the protracted conflict underlying the water dispute; (3) the historical and political claims made by the disputing countries Already four years after the downfall of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was identified as a region close to potential conflict regarding natural resource use [9, 10] . Although, Central Asia is not water poor, a major part of the available water resources is concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In fact, main surface runoff of the Aral Sea Basin (about 93 km 3 /year or 80%) is formed in the upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [11] . However, the main use of water (85%) occurs in downstream Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The two major rivers of the region, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, originate in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan (Figures 1 and 2 ). For this reason, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control most of the water resources needed by the other downstream states. However, Afghanistan as well, constitutes an important and up to now a more or less silent riparian. Sharing of the water from the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya has exposed a complex picture of water needs and potential political conflict [12] [13] [14] . During the last decades of the 20th century, the Aral Sea, the fourth largest lake in the world, has shrunk significantly [15] . This occurred due to increase of irrigated agricultural area from 4.3 to 8.2 million ha. When the ecology changed, an area of hundred thousand square kilometers containing a population of several million were jeopardized [16, 17] .
Gleick [18] (see also Dinar [4] for a discussion) notes that four main characteristics decide the graveness of a hydropolitical conflict, namely (1) the degree of scarcity, mismanagement, and misallocation of water in the region and the importance of water to a particular state; (2) the protracted conflict underlying the water dispute; (3) the historical and political claims made by the disputing countries over water; and (4) the relative power of the countries. A fifth characteristic is probably an upstream or downstream position as developed by Dinar [4] . The most serious conflict between ethnic groups of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks occurred in the Ferghana Valley in the Syr Darya Basin 1990 and 2010 [19] . Even if there is no concrete proof, we speculate that water availability had a significant influence on the conflict. In 2010, the clashes killed approximately 420 people, mostly Uzbeks, and another 80,000 were displaced (see also [20] for a more elaborate text on conflict and cooperation in the Ferghana Valley). The three countries Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have all historic and economic claims to the natural resources of the region [21] . At the same time, much work have been devoted by international donors and NGOs to solving the problems in the Ferghana Valley and introduce modern water management techniques. In view of the above, hydropolitical studies may include the five items above, or to simplify, two main factors, riparian position along the river or water course and relative power as considered by Dinar [4] . There are many examples of how these two factors may balance or imbalance each other (see e.g., Dinar [4] for three different major river basins). Militarily or economically stronger states (hydro-hegemons) may be able to by different means, coax weaker states into water agreements or arrangements that is not equitable [23] . Consequently, power balance, as indicated in the title of this paper, is a part of the general hydropolitical map of a water basin. The power balance may or may not be an important aspect of hydropolitics as also the geographical (physiographical) position along the river is important as mentioned above.
In view of the above, it is possible that local water disputes could escalate to regional conflicts. Ethnic tensions and border disputes, could lead to serious international conflict. The International Crisis Group [24] has also noted this. Thus, the objective of this paper is to review the renewable transboundary water resources in Central Asia and effects of climate change. We then analyse the hydropolitical map of Central Asia and some of the more important surrounding transboundary nations. Based on these analyses we suggest a future scenario for the water resources development in Central Asia and changes in regional hydropolitics.
Water Access in Central Asia
As mentioned above, Central Asia is in general water rich, though, water is unevenly distributed. The major parts of Central Asia are strongly continental semiarid to arid with a general shortage of freshwater. Mean annual country wide precipitation is 273 mm, varying from 161 mm in Turkmenistan to 691 mm in Tajikistan [25] . Kazakhstan, which is by far the largest country, receives an average annual precipitation of about 250 mm [26] . In general, the steppes and deserts receive less than 70 mm per year and the mountainous areas of Tajikistan can receive up to 2400 mm per year [27] [28] [29] . Annual potential evaporation varies from above 2250 mm in the arid region to less than 500 mm in the mountainous areas. Totally available and renewable water resources for each of the countries are given in Table 1 based on various sources [25, [30] [31] [32] . The first source states, e.g., that the total renewable water resources for Kazakhstan are 117 km 3 /year with 34 km 3 /year coming from sources outside the country. On the other hand, Ryabtsev [33] states these amounts to be 100.5 and 44 km 3 /year, respectively. As seen from the table, quite contrasting water resources amounts are stated by different sources. In general, there seems to be a great confusion how to define the renewable water resources for the different countries in Central Asia. Some of this confusion may be related to uncertainties in observations. The mountainous areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, e.g., contain large water storages in form of ice, snow, and glaciers. Parts of this water are annually or semi-annually renewable while the glacial deposits generally are not. Due to difficult observational terrain and few observational points, it is difficult to ascertain general volumes and what water volume that is renewable. There are, however, as well great uncertainties and conflicting views regarding transboundary water resources. The more recent reports from the World Bank, e.g., state that Central Asian river flows from other countries are not included in national estimates due to data unreliability. Groundwater resources in Central Asia are generally stated to constitute about 10%-15% of the surface water resources [12] . However, there are great spatial variation throughout Central Asia as well as great needs to better quantify volumes and quality of sub-surface water.
The general conclusion from Table 1 though must be that there is no country-wide general water scarcity in Central Asia. Uzbekistan represents the smallest per capita amount of water with 1870 m 3 /capita and year. A per capita water availability of less than 3000 m 3 per year is usually regarded as economic water scarcity [34] . Out of all countries, only Uzbekistan falls below this threshold. Thus, water scarcity is not a relevant term to indicate potential water conflict at the country level. On the other hand, just two major river basins, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya contain 73% of the total Central Asian population [35] . In this respect, Porkka et al. [36] found that over 80% of the total Central Asian population experience demand-driven water scarcity and 50% population-driven scarcity. Demand-driven water scarcity can be defined as water stress related to excessive use of otherwise sufficient water resources. Population-driven scarcity is related to water shortage occurring in areas where a large population has to depend on a limited resource. Thus, the main cause is over-exploitation of available water resources. Siebert and Döll [37] indicate that production of cotton, wheat, and rice consumes 86% of the agricultural water demand in Central Asia. Cotton alone represents 62%. Total renewable water resources (km 3 /year *) [30] 117 (34) 58 (0) 99 (16) 25 (23) 59 ( In view of the above, it is clear that the uneven distribution in space and time of potential water resources in combination with disproportionate and unrestrained irrigation withdrawal cause water scarcity where agriculture is intense. To solve these problems, a political will together with a democratic involvement of all stakeholders are necessary. It would also require an environmentally aware community. These characteristics are not yet well developed in Central Asia and combined with an autocratic leadership this may lead to repeating historical mistakes such the case of the Aral Sea [40] [41] [42] . The Amu Darya and the Syr Darya represent about 50% of the annually renewable water in Central Asia. Amu Darya represents a mean annual runoff of about 79.4 km 3 while Syr Darya represents about 37.2 km 3 [13, 43] .
Wasteful irrigation can be tremendous. It has been estimated that on average, the Central Asian states use 1.5 times more water on the fields than recommended [24] . ICG [24] states that 8000-10,000 m 3 of irrigation water (except water for leaching) can be used for one hectare of cotton [44, 45] . Thus, there is a huge potential for water saving in Central Asia. In general, more than half of the withdrawn irrigation water is lost through seepage loss and evaporation from irrigation channels. The predominant use of wasteful flooding and furrow irrigation is another area that can be made more efficient by use of modern and water-saving irrigation techniques.
Hydropolitical Map
In view of the above, more than 90% of the totally used water in Central Asia are used for irrigation [46, 47] . Farming irrigation corresponds to one-third of GDP and more than two-thirds of employment. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the two dominating economic powers of Central Asia. The Uzbekistan population is largest with about 30 million inhabitants and Kazakhstan with about 18 million inhabitants (Table 2 ; Central Asian total population equals about 68 million). Thus, the upstream population represents 15 million (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream population 53 million (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The total population of Central Asia will increase to about 89 million by 2050.
Kazakhstan has by far the largest economy with a GDP of USD 195 billion (Uzbekistan GDP equals USD 66 billion) [48] . Uzbekistan, however, appears to have the ambition to become the region's hegemon [49] . This is in line with the deployment of 1500 US troops (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) together with USD 160 million in US aid in 2002 to act against transnational terrorism [50] . Uzbekistan, due to its downstream position and dependence on agricultural economy with mainly cotton production, views irrigation as one of its key security issues [49] . Uzbekistan is a strong military power and together with its natural gas resources, it has reinforced its position as a hegemon in relation to the upstream Kyrgyzstan [4] . For example, it has attempted to convince Pakistan not to import generated electricity from a hydropower project involving both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan [4] .
Irrigation is also a security issue to Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhstan has a self-sufficient economy with a well-developed agriculture [49] . Kazakhstan is a major energy producer in the Commonwealth of Independent States. It produces oil, gas, and coal, and it is the leading producer and exporter of uranium ore in the world [49] .
Turkmenistan is politically stable and stresses its neutral position. The country has the fourth largest natural gas reserve in the world. However, it still depends on agricultural production for its economy (Table 2 ; 15% of GDP). Being a downstream riparian and aiming at developing food self-sufficiency it considers water availability a national security issue. Cotton production employs 44% of the country's work force [51] .
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the poorest and the two upstream countries in Central Asia (Table 2) . Tajikistan suffered from a civil war in 1992-97 that damaged infrastructure and economy [49] . Tajikistan relies heavily on agriculture for its economy (25% value added to GDP; Table 2 ). The country has the largest water resources in Central Asia due to its upstream location for both Amu Darya and Syr Darya. During recent years, Tajikistan has increased its hydropower capacity in order to become energy independent. Both Russia and Iran have supported hydropower dams along the tributaries of the Amu Darya. The Tajik language is a Persian dialect. In addition, Pashto and Dari, which are the official languages of Afghanistan, belong to the Persian language family. For this reason, Tajikistan is closer to Iran and Afghanistan as compared to other Central Asian states [49] . Kyrgyzstan also relies much on agriculture (16% value added to GDP; Table 2 ). The Kyrgyzstan population with a native Turkic language is constituted by mainly three ethnic groups: the indigenous Kyrgyz, the Russians, the Uzbek population. These population groups have different cultural and economic characteristics, however, 67% of the total population live in the Ferghana, Talas, and Chu valleys. Episodes of civil unrest have characterized especially the Ferghana Valley [52] .
Russia has an important relationship with Central Asia due to its history and it is the region's largest trade partner [53] . On 15 May 1992 an intergovernmental military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was signed focusing on economic and military regional coordination. The members include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan [53] [54] [55] . This has been interpreted as a way for Russia to re-establish its hegemony position in the area and counterbalance Chinese and American influence. During recent years, Russia has been reluctant in supporting upstream countries' hydropower ambitions. An interpretation of this is that it is trying to balance its relationship with downstream Uzbekistan and at the same time preserving its hydropower interests in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
As mentioned in the introduction, China can also be described as part of the new "great game" [56] . As in Africa, China has mainly invested by providing funds for infrastructure such as dams, roads, and power transmission lines. China's strategy appears to be to secure natural resources [57] .
As indicated above, besides irrigation, water resources are very important for energy production in the region. Hydropower accounts for 27% of the region's general power generating capacity [50, 58] . For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this percentage exceeds 90% [59] . Thus, their economies are more or less entirely dependent on available water resources. Changes affecting water resources in Central Asia are therefore directly affecting the economies and their social and socioeconomic development [59] .
The Ili River is especially important for the Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan. The Ili River originates in the Chinese Tien Shan mountains, crosses the border to Kazakhstan, and discharges into the southern part of Lake Balkhash. About 85% of the river basin lie within Kazakh territory and about 15% in China. The river, which is fed mainly by melting snow and ice, contributes about 80% of total inflow to the endorheic lake [60] . The discharge from Ili River entering the lake was 11.9 km 3 /year as an average for 1953-1969 [61] . The average flow decreased to 10.4 km 3 /year for the period 1970-2009. Causes for gradually decreased flow of the river are development of irrigated agriculture, industrial use, and development of the Kapshagai hydropower station [62] . The Lake Balkhash is one of the largest in Asia with an area of 16,400 km 2 and a volume of 112 km 3 . The lake is rather shallow, however, with an average depth of 5.8 m and thus, the lake area is sensitive to changes in inflow.
Another regionally important river is the Irtysh River in Kazakhstan. It originates in the Altai Mountains between Mongolia and China, enters Kazakhstan, and continues to Russia to join the Ob River. When it enters Kazakh territory from China the average flow is about 9 km 3 /year. When it leaves Kazakh territory to Russia the average flow is about 27 km 3 /year [62] . Both the Ili and Irtysh River water are likely to be used for expansion of Chinese agriculture and industry. Thus, first of all, Lake Balkhash and secondly downstream Irtysh will be affected. Allouche [63] indicates that China expects to use as much as 40% of the Irtysh flow. No agreement has been achieved between Kazakhstan and China on the Ili River flow. However, so far Kazakhstan has been able to mitigate China's aspirations to use the Ili River flow by sending big quantities of free or greatly subsidized foodstuff to China [63] .
In view of the above, it is clear that Central Asian hydropolitics are complex and involve major powers such as China and Russia. Thus, several water related agreements, mainly involving the five Central Asian states have been signed (Table 3) . The Almaty Agreement in 1992 (Table 3) was followed by among other things the creation of two important interstate organizations, the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC in 1993) and the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS in 1999). This can be seen as an effort to institutionalize the water management in the region [49] . However, due to lack of transparency and weak political commitment, this has not resulted in a decrease in water related tensions [24] . On the other hand, one of the IFAS activities, to save the Aral Sea, is perhaps the most successful so far. Kazakhstan has played a leading role in this endeavor. Kazakhstan was the first country in Central Asia to make efforts towards developing a comprehensive national plan for integrated water resources management (IWRM) [70] . Other Central Asian States have followed by incorporating various elements of IWRM such as, e.g., participatory approach and water user associations in Uzbekistan [71] . Major work in donor-related IWRM have been focused towards the politically complex Ferghana Valley. Compared to East and South East Asia, however, Central Asia as a total is ranked lowest regarding indicators for monitoring, information management, and dissemination, and low stakeholder participation. These are major components in efficient IWRM [70] . Tables 3 and 4 focuses on a select number of water related agreements established after 1991. For a broader list of existing international water law in Central Asia refer to works by, e.g., Soliev et al. [69] , Pak and Wegerich [72] , Pak et al. [20] , and Holmatov et al. [73] . Other general international agreements involving Central Asian States are described in detail by Ziganshina [74] . 
Uzbekistan
Complying to 1992 UNECE agreement (UN Economic Commission for Europe, Guidance on water and adaptation to climate change to convention on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes).
A country that is not included in Table 4 is Afghanistan. A substantial amount (22 km 3 /year or about 27.5%) of the Amu Darya annual flow is generated in Northern Afghanistan that belongs to the Amu Darya Basin [76] . About 5 km 3 /year of this flow are used for irrigation in Afghanistan. However, due to the turmoil in Afghanistan and little attention from the international community, Afghanistan has to a great extent been left out from international discussions and agreements. Tajikistan, however, has been instrumental in involving Afghanistan in international water collaboration. Two protocols (2007 and 2010) and a Memorandum of Understanding (2007) involving collaboration on water use and capacity building were signed by Tajikistan and Afghanistan [76] . However, still no formal regional agreement on collaboration between the five Amu Darya riparian countries has been reached. Afghanistan can potentially develop both hydropower and irrigation in upstream Amu Darya and this is likely to affect downstream riparians. Consequently, formal agreements on the water sharing between all riparians are in great need.
The Almaty Agreement in 1992 (Table 3 ) was the first major joint water management agreement between the Central Asian states after the downfall of the Soviet Union. The agreement meant in practice that the old Soviet Union water-sharing regime safeguarding the downstream cotton growing systems was agreed upon [77] . The agreement was passed despite protests from Kyrgyzstan.
At the time, Tajikistan was on the verge of a civil war. Thus, it appears that the three major economic powers of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) acted as hydro-hegemons and pushed through the agreement that would guarantee the downstream irrigation industry. The old management system involved dams and reservoirs in upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for use as either hydropower generation and/or downstream irrigation, mainly in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The main aim was to maximize economic output [13] . In most cases, this meant irrigated agriculture, especially cotton. After independence, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have seen opportunities to develop their economies by expanding hydropower production. The hydropower needs are greatest during the winter period. However, this would mean less water for irrigation during summer and hence a conflict situation with downstream countries [13] . The conflicts have repeatedly involved the Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan along the Syr Darya and irrigation in mainly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the Nurek and possible Rogun reservoirs along the Amu Darya in Tajikistan for hydropower and irrigation in downstream Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Details on the history, management, and related conflicts of these reservoirs are well described in a series of papers by Wegerich [3] , Wegerich et al. [78, 79] Dinar [4, 5] , Bichsel [12] , and Menga and Mirumachi [80] and will thus not be repeated herein. A common misconception in the scientific and national discourse, however, appears to be that hydropower and irrigation demand is conflicting and incompatible [80, 81] . Many examples prove the opposite. By applying upstream hydropower efficiency, expansion of downstream reservoir capacity, and downstream irrigation efficiency, often a win-win situation can be achieved [79, 82, 83] . In any case, we recognize that much or most of the international tension regarding water sharing in Central Asia concerns the irrigation-hydropower nexus. For this reason, we come back to this problem in the below chapter on the future of water management in Central Asia.
Climate Change
It is generally recognized that observed temperature has risen twice as fast in Central Asia as compared to global levels since the 1970s [84] . IPCC projections show a clear increase in future temperature by 2-4 • C for 2050 and 3-5 • C for 2080 for most of the region [85] [86] [87] . Precipitation projections are less certain and as well as less clear but indicate a small increase until 2050 and then a small decrease until 2085. In general, a small increase in observed annual precipitation has been noted for Central Asia even if spatial and temporal variations are large [59] . This is in line with the IPCC projections. Overall, small changes in future precipitation are probably to be expected.
Melt from glaciers in Tajikistan plays an important role in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya discharge. This contributes between 10%-20% of the total discharge of the two rivers. However, for dry years this contribution can increase up to 70% [59, 88, 89] . Due to increasing temperature, ice melt from the glaciers in this region, the Tien Shan, has tripled from 1950 levels. The total glacier mass from 1961 to 2012 has decreased by about 27% [90] . This corresponds to about four times the global average. Following this pattern, 50% of the total glacier volume in the Tien Shan of today, would be lost by 2050 [90, 91] . The consequences for the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya would be a decrease in flow by 10%-15% and 6%-10%, respectively [59] . In addition, the Ili River and other rivers feeding the Lake Balkash would also be severely affected by the disappearing glaciers in the basin [59] .
The typical pattern for the runoff that is fed by melting glaciers is that runoff could increase for a period up to 2020-2050 during intense melting. After this, a decrease would set in due to disappearing glacial volume. An example of this is Kyrgyzstan. For this country, surface runoff would increase until 2020-2025 because of glacial melt. After this period, runoff could decrease [59] . Similarly, for the most advantageous climate scenario, the overall hydropower potential of the rivers discharging into the Lake Issyk Kul may drop by 50% up to 2100 [59] .
Future of Water Management in Central Asia
As seen from the above, the present total population of about 68 million in Central Asia will have grown to about 89 million inhabitants by 2050. The per capita water volume per year will not decrease as dramatically by 2050 as for, e.g., some Middle Eastern water scarce countries. However, since irrigated agriculture and food security is of main concern to in principle all Central Asian states, it is reasonable to expect a much higher irrigation demand by 2050. The present irrigation systems are highly inefficient and wasteful [92] . However, changing irrigation management and increasing overall irrigation efficiency are complex socioeconomic processes that are expensive and will take long time to modify. Even though irrigated agriculture must increase the production of food to an increasing population, the production of irrigated lands and available water are decreasing. At the same time, increasing the water use efficiency in general results in reduced harvests [93] . Thus, it is difficult to foresee any major changes in the increasing irrigation needs for the coming decades. Climate change is likely to further increase the irrigation needs by increasing evaporative losses. However, due to melting glaciers, river discharge is likely to increase up to 2020-25 for Kyrgyzstan but leading to an irrevocable and substantial decrease beyond this point as mentioned above.
Developing IWRM has seen some success at the small scale, e.g., in the politically tense Ferghana Valley [94] and through EU donor-related projects in Kazakhstan [95] . However, on a whole for the region, the IWRM concept has not had much of a success regarding better water sharing. The reason for this appears to be that the three downstream countries have not seen any real motivation to change the original Soviet Union arrangement that was re-iterated in the Almaty agreement 1992. Several authors have noted that the collaboration between the future independent states in many instances was quite elaborate under the Moscow hegemon [20, 78] . However, after independence, the tendency has rather been towards trying to become more independent in relation to other riparians particularly within the Syr Darya Basin. In any case, the two politically weaker upstream countries have experienced that the old arrangement with energy for water has not been working in the new market economy. Thus, they are desperately trying to develop their own advantageous upstream location for energy production. In this sense, the largest reservoirs that store water for downstream irrigation are represented by Toktogul in Kyrgyzstan and Kayrakum in Tajikistan on the Syr Darya with 19.5 and 4.2 km 3 in storage capacity, respectively. The Nurek in Tajikistan on the Amu Darya similarly has a storage volume of 10.5 km 3 [96] . These reservoirs were designed during the Soviet Union period to provide water during the irrigation season for downstream areas (mainly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). However, they were also intended for hydropower production. Thus, Toktogul produces 93% of the electricity used in Kyrgyzstan and Nurek 70% of the electricity used in Tajikistan [97] [98] [99] .
The above, much follows the analogue of the Nile Basin, with downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) that for historical reasons use the major part of the Nile water in well-developed irrigation agriculture [100] . The hegemon Egypt has felt very little motivation to change its negative stance regarding the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in the politically and economically weaker Ethiopia. Ethiopia, however, has managed to raise funds outside of the well-established international funding agencies and has very much presented the project as fait accompli.
The Rogun Dam project in Tajikistan displays some similarity with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Both are large hydropower projects in economically and politically weaker upstream countries. The Rogun Dam reservoir in the Amu Darya Basin holds a water volume of 13.3 km 3 and a planned hydropower production of 13.1 TWh. The construction started already in the middle of the 70ies but halted after the Soviet Union collapse. In 1993, a flood wave destroyed much of the construction [63] . The construction started again in 2008 using Tajikistani funding. In 2012, the project halted due to a World Bank assessment [101] . On 1 July 2016 the Tajikistani commission in charge of the project selected the Italian company Salini Impregilo to proceed with the construction estimated at $3.9 billion [102] . Interestingly, the same company is in charge of building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam [103] . The Rogun project has continuously been condemned by mainly the Uzbek authorities for constituting a strong threat to downstream irrigation projects [104] . Studies indicate, however, that hydropower could be produced in the Rogun Dam with only minor effects for downstream users [82] . This, however, would require a close cooperation between upstream hydropower and downstream irrigation water users. In a similar way as for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam the entire population of Tajikistan has mobilized to build the Rogun hydropower plant by sale of plant shares [74, 103] . Consequently, the resemblance of large-scale hydropower development in poor upstream countries with downstream hegemons is striking when comparing the Nile and the Amu Darya where both the Great Renaissance Dam and the Rogun Dam are portrayed as national symbols and parts of regional projects [80, 104] .
Similar, though smaller-scale development, is recently taking place in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, Kyrgyz authorities accepted bidding to rehabilitate the 1200-MW Toktogul hydroelectric project, the largest hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan [105] . The same year and supported by the Russian state-owned RusHydro, Kyrgyzstan commenced projecting the $727 million Upper Naryn series of dams including four hydropower stations with a total capacity of 240 MW. Another venture is the proposed 1900 MW Kambar-Ata project. This is a planned project on the Naryn River including one of six planned dams to be built on the river. Together, they would equal 2140 MW to Kyrgyzstan's hydropower output [106] .
As in the case of the Nile Basin, the possibilities for water sharing between the Central Asian states are largely locked in a stalemate between historical heirloom and development needs. The more advantaged downstream countries are not likely to yield in this respect. This might be a reason why IWRM neither has been successful in the case of the Nile Basin nor in the major basins of the Central Asia [107] [108] [109] . Bichsel [12] notes that it may be questionable if the IWRM goals of economic decentralization, self-government, and empowerment can be achieved within strongly centralized and autocratic governance systems. She also notes that alternative approaches to IWRM may be necessary.
The inability of downstream basin hegemons to participate in a more fair basin-wide water resources development might trigger a unilateral hydropower development as seen in both the Nile and the Amu Darya Basins. This may not be a negative tendency. As a more even power distribution develops among the riparians this may lead forward to a better collaboration in the basin. This means that the upstream countries will develop the much needed hydropower resources without the consent of the downstream countries. However, in view of the risk to lose water the former hegemons would be more willing to act as collaboration partners, e.g., in IWRM.
In addition, more powerful neighbors such as China will likely withdraw increasing amounts of water that will affect mainly Kazakhstan [62, 63] . Along with climate change and population increase, available water resources are bound to decrease in a steady manner. This does not necessarily mean increasing risk for regional conflict. The chances for conflict are probably larger in local communities with ethnical tension.
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the passing of the Uzbek president Karimov on 2 September 2016 raised important questions for the future of the region with the intertwined water issue. It appears, however, that signs a few years before the Uzbek president's death, indicated gradually improved relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [110] . [110] . Even if it is too early to draw any concrete conclusions, this may be the start of better collaboration between the two countries. In a parallel manner in the Nile Basin, the Tripartite National Committee (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt) appears to frame a starting collaboration by technical development [100, 111] , where the underlying functionalism through technical collaboration can generate positive effects in a broader political sense.
Concluding Remarks
Central Asia has a population of 22 million that directly or indirectly depend on irrigated farming [31] . The irrigation consumes 90% of the sustainably available water resources. Thus, it can be summarized that the present water disputes are results of allocation policy rather than scarcity of water in the region [112] .
Deviating national priorities have not favored regional cooperation and hence there is no shared vision how to collaborate on water. In this sense, the main cause of instability in Central Asia is poor governance and divisive self-sufficiency politics. The autocratic regimes of Central Asia seem in general to be more interested in holding on to power than the well-being of their populace. Regional leadership is needed, while bottom-up processes and eventually democratization are necessary steps to build a stable equitable water resources plan for the region.
IWRM has seen some success at the local level. However, at regional level, results are scarce and with the present hydropolitical map with downstream hegemons are not likely to change the situation. However, the gradual build-up of hydropower capacity in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may eventually alter that map. Economic development of these two countries through gradual hydropower buildup will change the power balance in Central Asia and thus induce possibilities for a more equitable sharing of water resources.
Consequently, the answer to the question in the title to this paper is "Yes, however . . . ". The process is likely to take time and require unilateral development of hydropower as a first step. Changing hydropolitics in the Nile Basin appears to indicate a similar development in Central Asia.
